Don't Build GE at $10M
Keep process out of a small company until you can no longer avoid it, because speed is the main advantage a small company has over a large one.
Sales compensation in a consumption world has no silver bullet. Acquisition and install reps carry different numbers, acquisition sellers ideally carry no consumption quota, and plans layer bookings, consumption, spiffs, and target-incentive mixes — customized to the product and expected to keep iterating.
In a consumption model, acquisition and install reps should carry different numbers, and acquisition sellers ideally carry no consumption quota. Build a bookings plan for hunters and a consumption plan for install-base farmers, layered with spiffs and target-incentive mixes. There is no universal answer — comp must be customized to your product's consumption behavior, and teams should expect to iterate as legacy variable-pay models face a reckoning in a token/usage world.
How LeanScale runs delivery where Sales Compensation is involved.
Territory design is unusual: almost all the work lands in Blueprint. If you do that part right you can one-shot the whole plan and get a green light i…
Sales capacity planning converts a revenue target into headcount. It runs in six steps: set quotas and expected attainment, apply ramp time and attrit…
Fair territories come from valuation, not from geography. The sequence is: define the Ideal Customer Profile, identify data sources to score accounts …
A sales commission plan is where the growth model meets individual behavior. It should pay for the outcomes the plan depends on, stay simple enough fo…
Real engagements involving Sales Compensation.
A software company with a customer base in the thousands wanted to know where expansion revenue actually comes from. Four analysis waves across CRM, p…
A growth-stage cybersecurity vendor had no rigorous way to tell reps which accounts to work. LeanScale built an account priority score, a competitor-d…
A growth-stage AI company had no scored view of its market, so reps picked accounts on instinct. LeanScale built a weighted ICP matrix, the enrichment…
A financial-services technology company had a mature CRM in which the fields that actually predicted deal size were mostly empty, and was pushing into…
Keep process out of a small company until you can no longer avoid it, because speed is the main advantage a small company has over a large one.
No formal deal desk at or under roughly $20M ARR, a light email-based review around $50M, and forms and documentation as more approval layers appear.
Reps get a BDR after consistently booking a set number of meetings themselves, not as a prerequisite for booking them.
Allocate additional resources to proven performers, and coach up or coach out the rest.
A commission curve steep enough that top performers can't afford to leave and low performers can't afford to stay.
Evaluate reps against the team's average production as well as against quota, and let a tiered plan push that average up over time.
Accept a semi-improvised CRM early on, but go back and fix it while it is young rather than after years of growth.
Choose your first operations hire based on how strong finance already is.
Set up prospects on trial exactly like paying customers, tell them so, and invite them to test your support as well as your product.
Walk away from deals where matching a lower price destroys margin, provided you have differentiation and an objective way to show performance and ROI.
Leave fixed price increases out of the contract and set renewal price according to how much value each customer got.
Make decisions quickly with limited data, commit to them with conviction, and pivot without drama if they prove wrong. Aiming to be right about 70 percent of the time, rather than 100 percent, is what makes speed possible.
Peak performance is not being productive from eight to five. It is finding the specific periods of the day when you do your best work and spending them on the hardest task.
If everything in your day goes to your job, team and other people and nothing fills you back up, you are setting yourself up for a crash.
Instead of rigid boundaries that sales will force you to break, commit to doing whatever the number requires and, in the same breath, commit to the recovery you need.
Build pipeline by proactively sending a specific buyer a written point of view (what you think, how you can drive value for them, and proof points), rather than running high-volume sequences.
Every QBR presentation starts with the presenter reflecting on what happened in the quarter, why it happened and what they will do better.
A CRO coming in from the outside to turn around a revenue organization has to get three things right, in order: culture first, then structure, then operations.
A north-star vision to double the size of a business (2X) over two years (2Y).
Senior leaders go to customer meetings, ask the tough questions and learn the customer and the data firsthand, without overshadowing the account owner.
You don't need to be a buyer's top priority, only above the line of what they will actually fund this year.
Once the buyer says yes, stop selling. Continuing the pitch can only add reasons to reconsider.
A revenue-call technique: for each deal, imagine looking back at month-end after it failed to close, name the reason, then keep asking "what else?" until every risk is on the table.
Trying something new and paying attention to the team can lift performance even when the experiment itself fails.
The metrics a leader visibly inspects are the ones the team respects and moves.
Anthony Enrico's way of grouping RevOps work: first, GTM telemetry (can you measure what you report to the board?); after that, every project should improve conversion rate or velocity.
Split the revenue team to match a keep-grow-add strategy: one team defends and grows the largest and mid-sized customers, another hunts new logos.
Every behavior the strategy needs should be economically incentivized, so a rep unsure of the strategy can read it from the comp plan: if it pays you, do it.
A two-step fix for competing ARR numbers: get sales, founders, finance and RevOps in a room to decide how real contracts count, then produce that ARR every week from a single trusted source.
For a multi-year contract with an escalating price, report each year's value as ARR in that year and treat the increases as expansion revenue, rather than averaging or reporting the final-year value up front.
A starting rule for annualizing uncommitted usage revenue: average the last three months, treat it as MRR, and multiply by 12, then refine using the business's own usage patterns.
For an enterprise deal closed with no committed spend, estimate ARR by applying the realization rate and rollout time of comparable past customers, then make that number a company-wide delivery commitment.
A sales comp structure for variable revenue: pay simply on the committed amount, pay on a data-backed realization rate for the variable portion, and later true up or claw back against actuals.
A year-end bonus of an extra 5% for reps who hit quota in at least three of four quarters, designed to reward consistent attainment rather than one big quarter.
Go-to-market as an engine fueled by marketing and SDR dollars: the fuel has to match the engine, and much of RevOps' and finance's work is diagnosing warning lights quickly.
Run annual planning with two parties building separate models, one bottoms-up and one top-down, then reconcile the differences and agree a plan with the sales leader in the room.
During a fundraise, a paid pilot can be included in ARR as long as the amount that is pilot and not fully committed is disclosed in a footnote.
Run startup finance as one leader on a trusted, integrated stack, with selective outsourced help and AI handling analysis in the background.
Whatever a company spends on RevOps, the team should at least pay for itself annually — through reduced expense, a more productive sales team, or better decisions from better reporting.
Size a RevOps team by the capabilities the business is missing, not by a target headcount.
Aim a finite go-to-market budget at the specific places with the most defensible return instead of spreading it thinly across every product, segment and team.
Small percentage improvements in conversion or retention, applied to a large go-to-market base, are worth more than they look — and small slips cost as much.
The route from RevOps to the C-suite: own the reports and the numbers, and be able to explain how A connects to Z across every function, until you are a required seat in executive meetings.
Two ways a RevOps leader earns a board-meeting invitation: ask to sit in once trust is established, and debrief every board meeting with the CRO to prepare for the next one.
C-level seats tend to open during transitions and turmoil; the people who get them keep doing good work, build relationships, and volunteer when the moment comes.
A strong RevOps leader already carries the number in practice — at the CRO's hip, crossing the T's on every deal — even if the comp plan never had a quota.
The head of RevOps runs the pipeline and forecast calls in the CRO's stead, asking the questions the CRO would ask and taking the answers as the boss would.
Build storytelling by first practicing non-business stories — your own career — with your team and your CRO, then turning that practice into telling stories with numbers.
Writing down the tactical detail of how you personally do the job — call volume, timing, follow-up, organisation, the funnel and its conversion rates — until what looked like personality turns out to be a repeatable recipe someone else can run.
The point, usually three to six months in, where a rep stops obediently executing the playbook and says: I get it, I know how to do this, and I'm going to bring myself to the job.
An exercise in which a rep writes what their manager, peers and customers will say about them when they leave the job — and then works backwards to the behaviours that would earn it.
Translating the qualitative reputation you want — responsive, honest, knowledgeable — into stated numeric service levels, then publishing them to the people who will judge you by them.
The table-stakes contract Cole gives anyone on a revenue team he leads: know what good and bad performance look like and be aligned with your manager on it; be compensated fairly; be treated with respect; have the tools necessary to execute the job.
Running strategy by objectives at the leadership level — four to six priorities aligned to the founder's vision, reviewed with leaders every two weeks — while getting far more prescriptive about activity expectations at the individual rep level.
Proactively catching a high performer's base and OTE up to what the role is now worth, rather than waiting for them to lobby or for a competitor's offer you would then match.
Cole's rule for maturing leaders: people will roll problems to your feet, and the moment you pick one up you own it — so choose deliberately rather than reflexively.
The moment a career stops being a ladder of obvious next steps and becomes a set of trades — once basic needs are met, every promotion is a compromise between satisfaction, impact, title and compensation rather than a straightforward step up.
The five ingredients Cole weighs in any job — compensation, title, industry, leading people, and impact — tested by asking whether more money, a better title and a different industry would make you happy if you led nobody and felt no impact.
Hassan's description of RevOps at an early-stage hypergrowth company: building processes and systems while the foundations underneath keep shifting.
A smaller company is a small boat that is easy to steer, while a larger organization is a cruise ship that takes hours or days to change direction, so RevOps design has to match the vessel.
RevOps that agrees with everything a CRO says and executes is a ticketing center. Strategic RevOps asks why, explains the risks of a bad decision and offers alternatives that still reach the goal.
A compensation model for a business with no contracts, in which sales, post-sale and solutions engineers all take a percentage of each customer's monthly revenue for a year.
A prediction model that estimates a new customer's annual revenue from roughly their first 60 days of usage, trained on historical customer usage and adjusted for known seasonal patterns.
Reconciling the top-down target investors set with a bottoms-up model of how many reps, and how much marketing coverage, are needed to hit it.
Hassan's build order for the function: a generalist at Series A, a strategic leader with technical and analyst layers from Series B to D, and a specialized team after IPO.
The early-stage goal for RevOps: not to stop the chaos of a startup but to give it a method, so the environment is still chaotic but makes sense.
At Series B to D, the head of RevOps adds a technical persona and an analyst persona beneath them to absorb tactical work.
Sales is the driver everyone watches. RevOps is the pit crew doing unseen tire changes in seconds, and truly world-class RevOps also designs the car.
AI agents should be evaluated against the same north-star metrics as any other investment, not by asking for the ROI of the agent itself.
The knowledge of how the go-to-market systems actually work and how metrics are defined, which Hassan calls the most important piece of any AI deployment, and which sits with RevOps.
AI deployed without RevOps governance makes disinformation faster: it returns a wrong answer with confidence, and that answer spreads.
When a CRO asks what the ROI of RevOps is, reverse the question and ask what it costs to run a scaling go-to-market machine with nobody strategically designing, overseeing or managing it.
Apply first-principles reasoning to a backlog of requests to find the repeating root cause, collapsing fifty ideas into roughly three themes, then choose against the company's goal for the current or next quarter.
Require evidence of a first small milestone before funding scale, rather than skipping the messy manual trial-and-error phase that reveals what is actually scalable.
State the belief, the reasoning and the measurement in advance, then treat the outcome as a signal rather than the defining verdict, measuring the process separately.
Forward-deployed engineers and deployment strategists own post-sale activation and consumption, so account executives are compensated on bookings rather than on realised usage.
An application layer on a headless Salesforce holding the three things reps touch daily — a Kanban forecast board, a hackathon and AI-day calendar, and transcript-prefilled deal updates — with everything routing back to the CRM as source of truth.
An environment where non-engineers can ship internally built tools, with authorisation controlled at the integration level — read-only on some connections, read-write but never delete on others — rather than inheriting the builder's god-mode access.
A split between back-office RevOps (systems, process, tickets, quota fixes — never touches the field) and field-operator RevOps (lives between the sales team and the machine, injecting value into forecast calls, campaigns, and programs).
Build your internal operating rhythm around the four phases of how a customer consumes you — awareness, consideration & decision, implementation, and value realization — rather than around your org chart.
Staff sales enablement by treating every non-quota role (managers, RevOps, SEs, enablement) as overhead wrapped around a $1–2M-quota AE, and asking what each role gives back. Budget it zero-based and build it as a living sales academy, not a content factory.
Stand up formal enablement once a frontline manager's span of control passes five or six reps — earlier if you sell complex, enterprise, high-consideration products.
Split the field into hunters who acquire new logos (traditional sales path) and farmers who grow the install base aggressively, then engineer the bridge so neither feels the other is interloping.
In consumption revenue, the signed PO is where the work starts. Because revenue recognizes on usage, the entire post-signature job is driving adoption and demonstrated value.
Land small as a paid pilot, prove value fast, run a ~6-month 'double-tap' true-up, then bridge to the 12-month renewal — which is really the first real deal.
Acquisition and install reps carry different numbers; acquisition sellers ideally carry no consumption quota. Build a bookings plan for hunters and a consumption plan for farmers, layered with spiffs and target-incentive mixes.
Go-to-market gathers raw materials (account plans, commercial events, product releases, macro signals); a centralized data-science function owned by finance turns them into a forecast. Sellers cannot predict consumption.
Leverage is forcing your way into the room by making leaders unprepared without you. Trust is being invited in because sales leaders want you there. Only trust builds durable influence.
RevOps sits in a strange seat: reporting to the CRO but excluded from the CRO's peer conversations, while simultaneously knowing more than most of its peers and hearing things in rooms sales never enters.
AI is a productivity multiplier that requires clean data and human oversight. A productivity gain should be reinvested in more capacity to go faster, not banked as headcount reduction.
A CRO knows what to fix and even knows candidate strategies, then freezes — either because execution looks like an overwhelming amount of work, or from fear of taking a step back and breaking what already works. RevOps is where that freeze thaws.
RevOps shows up with a point of view on what the business should do rather than waiting for direction — enabled by an information edge, because the field shares candid feedback with the head of RevOps that it won't share directly with the CRO.
Keep an annual anchor tied to strategic and fundraising commitments, but plan continuously: evaluate performance to plan monthly, decide on adjustments quarterly, and run a second-half replan as conditions change.
A one-hour, bi-weekly meeting between RevOps and sales leadership, anchored on a fixed dashboard of five to eight initiatives, that serves as the catch-all forum for the business.
Beyond standing metrics, instrument each strategic bet on its own — a spiff's multi-attach rate, deal progression past a stuck stage, or pipe from moved vs. unmoved accounts — so you can prove whether it's working.
Data-driven modeling of territories across three lenses — firmographic (segment thresholds), 'smart plan' (balance by priorities like ARR or tier-A account count while minimizing disruption), and geography — layered with coverage, quota, and policy modeling.
Run territory planning like a gold-mining company: first know where the gold is, then decide which miners to send where, and keep the operation flowing when a miner goes down.
Survey your total addressable market and assign a potential revenue valuation to every account, then use that field to carve and balance territories so each seller has an equal amount of gold to mine.
The most consistent RevOps career path leads to COO; the way to grow toward it is to run RevOps today as if you already held the COO role — operationally minded, program-driven, and confident enough to lead the CRO.
A go-to-market model with no contracts and no renewals — pure pay-as-you-go, even on multi-million-dollar enterprise deals — so the customer can leave at any time and the company effectively re-earns the business every single day.
Anthony's framing for the startup-vs-scale-up choice: a big ship already has a direction and goes far; a jet ski is nimble and yours to steer. Oliver's corollary: at early stage you work ON the company (creating its DNA), and at scale you work IN it (executing).
Define ARR by taking collected revenue and extrapolating it forward twelve months, then stacking disciplined, repeatable consumption projections — derived from a customer's telemetry data or their prior-vendor usage — on top of the extrapolated actuals.
Pay commissions up front on a projected ACV — the customer's estimated one-to-three-year spend — protected by security-margin haircuts, a two-person review of the estimate, a rep-adjustable projection, and a consume-to-earn provision that only fully vests the commission once the customer actually consumes.
A comp plan surfaces problems but rarely causes them. If deals collapse at scale, the root cause is bad hires or a product that isn't doing its job — not the incentive structure, which only mitigates or escalates the underlying issue.
Staff a company in waves: SEALs first (operate confidently without supervision in uncharted terrain, mission evolves as they gather intel in the field), then Marines (build the foundation), then infantry (scale once the foundation exists).
Motivation is why someone joined your cause — intrinsic, and not the leader's job to install. Morale is how someone feels in a given moment — situational, and squarely the leader's job to manage by supporting people through hardship without removing it.
The real leverage from AI isn't the model — it's the discipline of organizing and maintaining company knowledge so an agent has clean, current context to draw from, turning a one-hour subject-matter meeting into a five-minute prompt that's 95% right (plus a ten-minute human review of the output).
A maturity path for tying customer success to revenue: crawl (run a value cycle, lead with hard value, and book CSMs under S&M not COGS), walk (give CSMs CSQL goals and track the funnel), run (train CSMs to close simple upsells, or add an account-management layer inside the CS org for complex ones).
A way to tie business outcomes at the customer back to your product. Soft value is sentiment-based (how the customer feels); hard value is measurable — hours saved, dollars saved, headcount saved — that you can attach real numbers to.
When CSMs don't own the upsell directly, they're accountable for surfacing a set number of customer success qualified leads through normal customer work and handing them to sales; the leader tracks close rate, cycle time, revenue, and funnel shape.
Call it a bonus, not a commission, to shift the mindset. Pay 80% base / 20% bonus, split into two or three parts. The three-part version weights NPS, gross retention (an individual number), and net retention (a company/team goal) a third each; the two-part version drops NPS for individual gross plus company net, with an upside kicker above 115% NRR.
Give everyone in the company — not just customer-facing roles — a small bonus tied to NPS and NRR, so office managers and engineers alike have a stake in customer sentiment and retention.
Picture a bucket with capacity 100 (100% retention). The hose pouring in is revenue; you want to fill and overflow the bucket (>100% NRR). Every hole punched in the bucket is churn.
A CS-plus-sales/AM pod structure is justified only when the average contract value and the available 'green space' to expand support the coverage cost; otherwise a single AM covers the whole portfolio.
Have each team member list what they do daily, weekly, and monthly. Anything that doesn't require critical thinking is a candidate to hand to AI — via custom GPTs or purpose-built tools — freeing CSMs for critical thinking and human relationship-building.
Model your target as current ARR + new ARR + expansion − churn/contraction. New ARR is new logos (and new contracts with existing customers); expansion and churn both come from the existing base.
Take the macro ARR goal and reverse-engineer it top-down through funnel metrics (net retention, SQL-to-close, sales cycle, MQL-to-SQL, average ACV) and bottom-up through the resources and team (CS capacity, quota/performance, ramp time, cost per SQL, salaries) required to hit it.
When executives challenge the outputs (reps, budget, pipeline required), don't defend the outputs — send them back to the inputs and ask which specific assumption they'd change: conversion rate, sales cycle, MQL-to-SQL, expected performance.
Because deals don't close the month a lead arrives, the length of the sales cycle dictates when pipeline must exist. A two-quarter cycle means the pipeline for Q3 bookings has to be built in Q1.
A rep is 'ramped' only when building pipeline and closing at full productivity — not when training ends. Ramp time should never be shorter than the sales cycle, which forces you to hire ahead of the number.
The board evaluates the plan not as a sum of initiatives but as unit economics balanced against growth, judging whether the company can graduate to the next funding stage. If it fails that test, the CEO and CFO reject it back to you.
Because you invest in SaaS before results arrive, unit economics degrade when you invest and improve as ROI lands. Plan a trend that grows into the economics the board wants — not a perfect green line every quarter.
Anchor and stress-test assumptions against VC/PE-published benchmarks (win rate by ARR band and deal size, quota-to-OTE ratios, funnel conversion rates) so the conversation becomes 'you vs. the market' instead of 'you vs. the person.'
Replace the static spreadsheet with scenario modeling for sensitivity analysis, live progress-to-target reporting, a core-vs-new-bets split, and a daily sales-tracker email that becomes the company's single source of truth.
There are no silver bullets. Compounding small, daily improvements — messaging, coverage, demos — is what drives real growth: 1% better every day is roughly 37x over a year, while 1% worse is a ~97% loss.
Sum, across all possible outcomes, of each outcome's probability times its value: EV = P(outcome1) x V(outcome1) + P(outcome2) x V(outcome2) + ... . A positive EV is a good bet; a negative EV is a bad one.
From Annie Duke's book: judge choices by the quality of the bet given what you knew, not by whether the single outcome was good or bad. A good decision can lose and a bad decision can win.
A core value of Spencer's company: constant, incremental self-improvement — applied here to decision-making, by reviewing whether a choice had positive expected value regardless of how it turned out.
The ratio of the amount you must call to the total pot you stand to win, expressed as the minimum win probability that justifies calling. Call $100 into a pot that becomes $400 and you have 25% pot odds.
Model each go-to-market segment as a bet: win rate (probability) times ACV (value) gives per-deal EV; then layer in deal volume, fully-loaded rep cost, and marketing cost to get the true expected value of investing in that segment.
A calculated field in Salesforce or HubSpot — built from custom properties and workflows — that outputs how much a given account or open deal is 'worth' by expected value, so reps can filter to the highest-EV deals.
Build territories and quotas from expected value — TAM and account valuation weighted by expected conversion rate — rather than gross dollar value.
A five-part checklist for a trustworthy CRM: (1) enable field history tracking, (2) timestamp critical stage and status changes with custom fields, (3) freeze closed-won data, (4) flow lead data into every object on conversion, and (5) put validation rules in place.
Turning on Salesforce field history tracking to record how data evolves over time, providing an audit trail for diagnosing issues and a historical snapshot for admins, users, and downstream tools.
Dedicated custom fields that capture the date each important status or stage changed — lead status, lead lifecycle stage, opportunity stage, customer stage, or proof-of-concept stage — so change data is directly reportable.
Locking closed opportunity data so it can't be edited after the deal closes — restricting changes to a super admin and reinforcing it with validation rules, automation, and weekly backups.
Ensuring that when a lead converts, its important fields — lead source, lead source detail, owner/SDR, and lifecycle timestamps — carry across to the account, contact, and opportunity records.
Rules that block records from saving unless they meet your business process — from simple checks (required amount, no past close dates) to methodology-driven requirements that ask for the right data at each stage.
Partnerships require giving value — and making concessions — before you get anything back, in contrast to the common approach of building a channel purely to sell more of your own product.
A partnership program must be sponsored from the board and executive leadership down, because early concessions and delayed ROI can't survive quarter-to-quarter decision-making.
Treat your strategic partners as potential acquirers, using a multi-year partnership to build relationships, test integration and cultural fit, and position for a strategic exit.
Concentrate limited bandwidth on a select few high-conviction partnerships where the combination is disproportionately valuable, rather than spreading thin across many low-producing relationships.
Build trust so high that a partner would call your personal phone at 3am on a Sunday and know you'll pick up and problem-solve as eagerly as they need.
Deliberately weight travel and face-to-face time above other activities to win partners' hearts and minds and to harvest the off-the-record intelligence that never surfaces on a recorded call.
Give every partner equal access to support, technology teams, and roadmap, and hold commercial terms you'd be comfortable exposing to a partner's competitor — the foundation for managing channel conflict.
Tie the partnership team's KPIs to overall company revenue rather than channel-only revenue, so channel and direct teams succeed together.
Make an honest assessment of whether a partner motion fits your GTM, then either fully commit the resources or don't start — no one-foot-in, one-foot-out programs.
An informed estimate of what a usage-based deal will be worth over its first 12 months (or a chosen period), assigned even when zero dollars are contractually committed, so the deal can be reported, forecast, and managed.
A closed-loop discipline of tracking each deal's real consumption against its assigned expected value — daily, monthly, or otherwise, but at least through the first year — to see where estimates over- or under-called.
A method for estimating expected value that starts from a data baseline — usage trends of similar companies and of a customer's first three, six, and nine months — then layers in rep discovery, safeguards, and discounts to land a defensible number.
The anti-pattern of forcing usage into a committed contract by discounting the per-unit price — e.g., committing 25% of expected volume for a 10% price cut — to buy reporting predictability.
Conversation, not measurement — quotable, but weigh it accordingly.
“Don't engineer your company to be GE when you're at $10 million in revenue, because you're giving up the only advantage you have.”
“I will argue you do not need a deal desk if you are 20 million or under an ARR, and I'm choosing that number roughly.”
“Salespeople have a tendency to be like water. They take the path of least resistance.”
“When I had one, I literally couldn't breathe. I felt like my chest was caving in on itself. I had no idea what was happening. I felt like I was dying.”
“To be a peak performer, it doesn't mean that you have to be a peak performer between eight and five. It means that you've got to find the periods of time throughout the day that you are the most productive.”
“In order to be different, in order to be elite, you have to do the things that others are unwilling to do.”
Ari Greenberg on what to leave out at each stage: why a deal desk can wait until about $20M ARR, BDRs as a reward for reps who already book meetings, a tiered commission plan that lets the rest leave on their own, the proof of concept that crashed and won the customer, letting the cheap guy win, and selling when the buyer has AI too
Miles Kirkpatrick on the panic attack that changed how he works, finding a 45-minute peak window, decision velocity versus flip-flopping, promoting a commercial roofer to run customer success, and building pipeline with points of view instead of sequences
Chris Adamkowski on walking into a sales team that was churning more than it sold, the three pillars of a turnaround (culture, structure, operations), 2X2Y, the slowest camper, stop at yes, a revenue call built on "what else?", and putting churn in the comp plan
Luke McKinlay on the one number every startup is valued on: aligning the company on one ARR definition, ramping contracts, usage revenue with no commitment, zero-floor enterprise logos and pilots, comp plans that true up, fewer reps, finance and RevOps as best friends, and running finance as a team of one with AI
Thurman Sneed on going from auditor to Chief Revenue Officer, the rule that RevOps should pay for itself every year, the power of one percent, how to get invited to the board meeting, volunteering for interim CRO and being made COO, and why the answer to "COO or CRO?" flipped in the last ten years
Cole Gillespie on writing the recipe for a sales rep, turning "responsive" into a three-hour SLA, the four things every person should expect off the elevator, and why the leader who has to be asked for the raise already lost
Hassan Irshad on the RevOps build order from Series A to post-IPO, compensation without contracts, and why AI makes the context layer RevOps owns more valuable than ever
Justin Lee on building GTM on a headless Salesforce, the empathy an SDR seat teaches, and the messy mechanics of consumption pricing
Jimmy O'Halloran on the operator's playbook for RevOps, sales enablement, and consumption revenue
Pete Shelton (CRO, Fullcast) on the CRO Dilemma, continuous planning, and becoming the operator your CRO can't run the business without
Oliver Manojlovic (CRO, Dash0) on pure pay-as-you-go GTM, ARR without contracts, consumption comp, hiring SEALs, and motivation vs. morale
Maranda Dziekonski on tying CS to revenue, comp plans, NRR, brand, and real AI use cases
Anthony Enrico (LeanScale) and Guillaume Jacquet (Vasco) on reverse-engineering ARR, unit economics that pass the board, and killing reforecast hell
Spencer Hodgson on betting on channels and reps with expected value
LeanScale Chief Architect Henrique Sakai on the five CRM foundations that make your revenue data trustworthy
Tim White on why partnerships are a give-to-get game, a strategic-acquisition on-ramp, and a relationship business you can't fake
Bernardo Alves on valuing new business and pipeline when nothing is committed